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Abstract
In a model where firms rely on bank financing to build capacity, put up specialized pro-
ductive assets as collateral, and then compete à la Cournot, we introduce a probability of
default. We investigate how the number of competitors affects the equilibrium amount of
bank credit and derive conditions under which an inverted U-shaped relationship occurs.
On one hand, more competitors enhance the resale value of collateralized productive as-
sets. On the other hand, more competitors shrink firms’ profits and the resulting income
that can be pledged to banks. We then extend the analysis to firms outside the Cournot
industry that are willing to buy productive assets in liquidation and show that the equi-
librium bank credit becomes monotonically decreasing in the number of competitors.
JEL classification: G33 (Bankruptcy, Liquidation); G34 (Mergers; Acquisitions; Restruc-
turing; Corporate Governance); L13 (Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets); D21 (Firm
Behavior: Theory).
Keywords: number of competitors; collateralized bank financing; resale of productive
assets; outside firms.
∗We appreciated comments from two anonymous reviewers, Joao Montez, Julian Neira, Marco Pagnozzi and
participants at the Conference on Liquidity, Banking and Financial Markets, Bologna University, (June 2012),
the 39th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE),
Rome (September 2012), the 28th Annual Meetings of the European Economic Association (EEA), Gothen-
burg, Sweden (August 2013), the 54th Meeting of the Italian Economic Association (SIE), Bologna (October
2013), the Conference on Financial Development and Economic Stability (FDES), Durham, UK (September
2016), and seminar participants at CSEF, Naples (November 2013) and Free University of Bozen/Bolzano
(November 2013). This paper originates from a version circulated under the title ”Product market competi-
tion and collateralized debt”.
aCorresponding author: Bicocca University, Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, Piazza
dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milano, Italy; e-mail: vittoria.cerasi@unimib.it; phone: +39-02-6448-5821.
bFree University of Bozen/Bolzano, Faculty of Economics and Management, Piazza Università 1, 39100
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Startup firms and small enterprises crucially rely on external financing, especially bank credit,
to install capacity and begin production and/or to undertake new risky investments (e.g., Beck
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Credit conditions for firms depend on
several factors, such as the macroeconomic environment and credit market structure. In this
theoretical paper, we focus on a specific factor, that is, product market competition (PMC)
and investigate how it affects the equilibrium amount of bank credit available to firms.
Most of the literature points to the negative effect of PMC on credit (for empirical evidence
on big companies, see, e.g., Valta, 2012, Xu, 2012, Frésard and Valta, 2016). The theoretical
intuition is that competitive pressure shrinks firms’ expected profits and the income that can
be pledged to lenders; in turn, this reduces the amount of credit firms can access (Holmstrom
and Tirole 1997).
Yet, firms can put up productive assets (PAs) as collateral to enhance their borrowing ca-
pacity. As a consequence, not only firms’ profitability but also the value of their collateralized
PAs is a crucial determinant of credit availability. Indeed, firms may default, in which case
lenders recover part of their capital by seizing and selling collateralized PAs (for empirical
evidence on the positive relationship between collateralized PAs’ liquidation value and credit
conditions, see, e.g., Gan, 2007, and Chaney et al., 2012). The recent financial crisis pointed
to the relevance of the collateral channel for startup firms’ and small enterprises’ access to
credit (e.g., European Commission, 2014, and Giovannini et al., 2015).
Interestingly, PMC, as measured by the number of competitors in a specific market,
matters for the liquidation value of collateralized PAs, especially when assets are industry-
specific. Direct competitors are indeed the second best users of PAs, hence they are willing
to bid the most for them. In a seminal contribution, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that
the resale value of collateralized PAs is affected by the state of health of competitors (for
evidence on the fact that PAs of distressed firms are mostly valuable for direct competitors,
see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2007, Habib and Johnsen, 1999, Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014,
and Gavazza, 2010).
This paper aims to fill a gap in the literature by showing that less concentrated industries
provide a larger pool of potential buyers of industry-specific PAs than highly concentrated
industries and can thus enhance their liquidation value; the resulting positive effect of PMC
on credit through the collateral channel, indeed, received scant attention. More precisely,
we propose a framework where PMC influences both firms’ profitability and the PAs’ resale
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value to investigate the effect of this twofold mechanism on the equilibrium amount of bank
credit.
In a model where firms demand bank credit to install production capacity and then
compete à la Cournot, we introduce an exogenous idiosyncratic probability of default. A key
premise of our framework is that banks can anticipate the negative outcome before Cournot
competition takes place.1 In this case, banks seize the collateralized PAs of distressed firms
and sell them in the secondary market, where healthy competitors (i.e., those who are not
hit by the shock) are the only potential buyers.2
Our main findings are as follows. There are conditions under which an inverted U-shaped
relationship occurs between the equilibrium amount of bank credit and the number of rivals
in the Cournot oligopoly. The intuition rests on the following trade-off. On one hand, the
number of competitors positively affects the expected resale value of PAs, thus enhancing the
income that can be pledged to banks. This is because the PAs of a failing firm are valuable
only if there are healthy rivals willing to make an offer for them. The probability of such a
favorable event increases along with the number of competitors. On the other hand, such
number negatively affects the equilibrium price and the firms’ profits, therefore shrinking the
equilibrium credit.
An important extension of the model considers firms that produce similar goods out-
side the relevant market. These firms, referred to as outsiders, are willing to purchase PAs
in liquidation and enter the market by replacing distressed incumbents. The existence of
outsiders in competition with healthy incumbents to acquire the PAs enhances their resale
value. At equilibrium, the amount of bank credit available to incumbents is larger than in the
case without outsiders, but it becomes monotonically decreasing in the number of incumbent
firms.
Overall, our contribution is twofold. First, we highlight a previously overlooked positive
effect of PMC on bank credit through the collateral channel. Second, we show that the way
this collateral channel works is crucially affected by the existence of outsiders. Our results
find some support in the empirical literature, which is extensively discussed in Section 6;
more importantly, they are relevant for startup firms’ and small enterprises’ access to credit
and their ability to invest. In particular, the model points to the importance of enhancing
1As argued by, e.g., Rajan (1992), banks are more likely to be informed about the future outcome of
productive projects than other ”arm’s-length” creditors, such as bondholders.
2An important aspect of the idiosyncratic shock is that the distressed firms’ PAs do not lose their value
and can thus be sold in the secondary market. In other words, we disregard shocks such as burning or flood
of the productive sites.
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the liquidity of collateralized PAs for firms that mostly rely on bank credit.
Related theoretical literature. The research question of this paper was inspired by
Shleifer and Vishny (1992). In their work, as mentioned, PAs are mostly valuable for com-
petitors in the same industry; as a result, credit-constrained firms can increase their debt
capacity when direct rivals are in a position to make an offer for the assets.
There exists a strand of theoretical literature, which relates credit availability to PMC;
in particular, the impact of external financing on firms’ competitive behavior in the product
market is investigated (e.g., Brander and Lewis, 1986, and the survey by Cestone, 1999).
Our focus is instead on the reverse causality, in particular, on the impact of PMC on bank
financing through the collateral channel. To the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical
paper where this feedback is explored is Cerasi and Fedele (2011), who consider asymmetric
information between firms and lenders and focus on a duopoly without outsiders. Salgado
et al. (2016) and Almeida et al. (2011) are also related to our paper. Salgado et al. (2016)
introduce a duopoly setting, where firms experience a common negative shock, to explore the
impact of market structure on the liquidation value of assets, rather than on bank financing.
In particular, they study the optimal timing at which collateralized PAs should be sold to
avoid misallocation. Almeida et al. (2011) develop a model with liquidity shocks similar to
those in this paper in order to study the availability of credit lines for firms with industry-
specific PAs; however, they do not investigate PMC.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model, while
Section 3 computes the equilibrium credit. Section 4 provide some comparative statics on
the equilibrium results. Section 5 extends the analysis to outsiders. Section 6 discusses the
main assumptions of the theoretical framework, while Section 7 reviews the related empirical
literature. Section 8 concludes the paper. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 Setup
Consider an industry with N ∈ [2,∞) ex-ante symmetric risk-neutral firms and three dates
t = {0, 1/2, 1}. At date 0, each firm i = {1, ..., N} builds production capacity by investing
the amount cqi, where qi denotes the capacity level and c > 0 the unit capacity cost. Firm i
will be active in the product market at the future date 1 with probability p ∈ (0, 1], in which
case the firm will produce a homogeneous good and will make positive profits; by contrast,
firm i will be hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock with probability (1− p), in which case it
will not be active in the product market at date 1 and its profits will be zero. Probabilities
4











Each firm i borrows
























p are i.i.d. across firms. The probability distribution of firms’ shocks is common knowledge.
Firm i is cashless, hence the amount Bi = cqi to finance the investment in capacity at date 0
is borrowed from a risk-neutral bank. The loan agreement is a collateralized debt contract;
the collateral consists of firm i’s PAs, i.e., the assets bought to install capacity qi. We denote
with ri > 0 the amount firm i commits to repay to bank i at date 1; due to limited liability,
firm i repays ri only if it is not hit by the shock.
At an interim date 1/2, each bank i receives a perfect signal about the future realization
of firm i’s profits. If the signal is negative - this occurs with probability (1− p) - bank i
anticipates that firm i will not be able to repay the debt at date 1 because of the lack of cash
flow; bank i then seizes the PAs of the defaulted borrower, sells them in the second-hand
market, and cashes their liquidation value; this mechanism is common knowledge. Healthy
rivals, i.e., those not hit by the shock, are the only potential buyers of PAs. Since healthy
firms are cashless, they are granted additional funds from their banks to purchase the PAs
of failing rivals. Accordingly, the equilibrium repayment ri will be computed by taking into
account also the potential extra funds granted by bank i at t = 1/2 in case firm i is healthy.
At date 1, healthy firms compete à la Cournot in the product market, the unit production
cost being 0, and repay the debt; this Cournot quantity cannot exceed firm’s total capacity
level, given by the capacity installed at date 0 plus the possible additional capacity given
by the purchase of PAs from failing rivals at date 1/2. The inverse demand function for
the homogeneous good supplied by healthy firms is given by P = S − bQ, where S denotes
the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay, with S > c, and b measures the effect of total
industry output Q on price P .
Before proceeding, we depict the complete timing of the three-stage capacity-constrained
quantity competition game played by firms and banks.
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We introduce the following assumption:






Assumption 1 states that the unit capacity cost c is relatively high; doing so, it restricts the
set of equilibria of the three-stage game and simplifies the analysis. In particular, as it will
become clear later on, the equilibrium capacity set by firms at date 0 will be relatively small
due to high c; as a result, all healthy firms will find it profitable to make an offer for all the
PAs on sale at date 1/2, in order to increase the limited capacity installed at date 0, and
they will produce at full capacity at date 1. For the sake of completeness, in Section 5 we
relax Assumption 1, study a simplified version of the three-stage game for any c ∈ (0, S), and
show that our results are not qualitatively affected.
3 Equilibrium
We compute the equilibrium of the three-stage game restricting on pure-strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNEs). As mentioned, Assumption 1 drives the outcomes of the
second and third stages. In particular, Cournot competition at date 1 has a trivial solution
because healthy firms simply produce at full capacity, whose equilibrium level is given by the
solution to the first and second stage, and, at date 1/2, all healthy firms are willing to make
an offer for all the PAs on sale. Accordingly, we first compute the second-stage equilibrium
offers by healthy firms; we then, by backward induction, calculate the first-stage equilibrium
capacity level and the resulting amount of credit granted by banks.
The equilibrium offers for the failing firms’ PAs are computed under the assumption that
in case of a tie in the healthy firms’ simultaneous offers, indivisible PAs are randomly assigned
to a single firm who pays the offered price. Three alternative scenarios must be investigated
separately, depending on the number of healthy firms at date 1/2, which we denote by H.
(i) When H ∈ [2, N − 1] firms are healthy at date 1/2, we rely on a Bertrand argument to
state that the equilibrium offer for any single failing firm’s PAs coincides with the maximum
amount of money healthy firms are willing to pay. This amount is defined as the reservation
value and it is given by the extra-revenue any healthy firm gains when acquiring the additional
production capacity of failing rival’s PAs. In symbols,
PN2q
∗ − PNq∗ (= PNq∗) , (1)
where q∗ denotes the equilibrium symmetric capacity level set by all firms at date 0 and PN =
S − bNq∗ indicates the price of the homogeneous good when the PAs of all N firms remain
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productive given that all failing firms’ PAs are acquired by healthy rivals. Expression (1) is
the difference between the revenue made by any healthy firm when it acquires a failing rival’s
PAs and then produces at full capacity q∗ + q∗ = 2q∗, and the revenue when no acquisition
occurs, the production being therefore q∗. Since (1) is the same for all H ∈ [2, N − 1] healthy
firms, there will be a tie in the equilibrium offers, with the effect that any healthy firm gets
the PAs with probability 1H . Note that the capacity cost cq
∗ does not enter in (1) because it
is sunk at date 1/2.
(ii) When only one firm is healthy at date 1/2, H = 1, the equilibrium offer for the PAs
of each of the (N − 1) rivals is equal to ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small positive amount.
This infinitesimal amount is the winning offer when only one firm is willing to purchase PAs
because, reasonably, this firm has full bargaining power.
(iii) Finally, when either all firms or none of them are healthy, H = N or H = 0, there is
no transfer of PAs.
3.1 Special Case with N = 3
For simplicity, we first calculate the equilibrium capacity in the special case where three firms
are present at date 0. In the next subsection, we extend the result to the general oligopoly
case with N ≥ 2 firms.
We calculate the representative firm 1’s and bank 1’s expected profit functions at date 0.
Denoting by q1 the capacity level installed by firm 1 at date 0 and anticipating that q
∗ (3) is
the equilibrium capacity set by each rival at date 0, firm 1’s profit function is
U1 = p (P3q1 − r1) + p
[
2p (1− p) 1
2
P3q
∗ (3) + (1− p)2 P32q∗ (3)
]
+ (1− p) 0. (2)
Expression (2) consists of three terms. First term: with probability p firm 1 is healthy at
date 1, it produces at full capacity q1 without additional production costs and earns P3q1,
where P3 = S − b [q1 + 2q∗ (3)] indicates the price of the homogeneous good when the total
production is equal to the total capacity, q1 + 2q
∗ (3), regardless of the allocation of PAs
among healthy firms; moreover, it repays r1 to bank 1. Second term: when one rival, either
firm 2 or firm 3, fails - probability 2p (1− p) - firm 1, along with the healthy rival, is willing
to purchase the failing rival’s PAs; it actually acquires them with probability 12 and gets
the extra-revenue P3q
∗ (3); this value is obtained by substituting N = 3 and q∗ (3) into (1).
When instead both rivals fail - probability (1 − p)2 - firm 1 is the only potential buyer of
the two rivals’ PAs, acquires them with probability 1, and gets the extra-revenue P32q
∗ (3).
Third term: if firm 1 fails - probability (1− p) - it earns nothing.
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The expected profit function of bank 1, denoted by V1, is as follows:
V1 = p
[








p2P3q1 + 2p(1− p)ε
]
− cq1. (3)
Expression (3) consists of three terms. First term: when firm 1 is successful - probability
p - bank 1 pockets r1. Moreover, when only one rival fails - probability 2p (1− p) - bank 1
lends an expected extra amount 12P3q
∗ (3) to firm 1, which offers P3q
∗ (3) to buy the PAs
of the failing rival, 12 being the probability that firm 1 obtains the PAs on sale and actually
pays the offered price. When the two rivals default - probability (1− p)2 - bank 1 funds the
amount 2ε offered by firm 1 to acquire the PAs of both rivals. Second term: firm 1 fails
with probability 1 − p; when both rivals are healthy - probability p2 - bank 1 sells firm 1’s
PAs at price P3q1, which is offered by both competing buyers; with probability 2p (1− p)
only one rival, either 2 or 3, is healthy and buys at price ε because it has full bargaining
power. Finally, we set the risk-free rate to be zero, so that the last term, −cq1, denotes the
opportunity cost of the amount lent to firm 1. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the
expected extra credit granted by bank 1 when firm 1 is the only healthy one, −p(1− p)22ε,
cancels with the expected value recovered from the sale of firm 1’s PAs in case only one rival
is healthy, 2 (1− p)2 pε.
To compute the expected repayment pr1 owed by firm 1 to bank 1, we suppose that bank
1 operates on a break-even basis; in symbols, V1 = 0. We then solve V1 = 0 by pr1:
pr1 = cq1 + p
2 (1− p)P3q∗ (3)− (1− p) p2P3q1. (4)
The expected repayment pr1 required by bank 1 to break even increases with the opportunity
cost of lending, cq1, and with the expected extra-credit disbursed to firm 1 when the firm,
along with an healthy rival, is willing to buy the failing rivals’ PAs, p2 (1− p)P3q∗ (3). On
the contrary, pr1 decreases with the expected value recovered by bank 1 from the sale of firm
1’s PAs when the two rivals are healthy, (1− p) p2P3q1.
Plugging (4) into (2) gives firm 1’s expected profits at date 0,
U1 = p
[
P3q1 + (1− p)2 P32q∗ (3)
]
+ (1− p) p2P3q1 − cq1. (5)
Expression (5) can be read as follows. With probability p, firm 1 is successful and earns P3q1.
It gains the extra revenue P32q
∗ (3) when it is the only buyer of both rivals’ PAs - probability
p(1 − p)2 - and produces at the additional capacity 2q∗ (3). This purchase is costless in
expected terms for bank 1 and, thanks to the bank’s break-even condition, for firm 1; the
aforementioned reason is that the expected extra credit granted by bank 1, −p(1 − p)22ε,
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cancels with the expected value recovered from the sale of firm 1’s PAs when just one rival
is healthy, 2 (1− p)2 pε. By contrast, with probability (1 − p) firm 1 fails and makes no
profit; yet, according to (4), the expected repayment pr1 required by bank 1 to break even
is reduced by the resale value of firm 1’s PAs, P3q1, offered by both rivals when they are
healthy - probability p2. The last term, cq1, is the capacity cost.
At date 0, firm 1 chooses q1 to maximize (5), given that each rival sets the equilibrium
capacity at q∗(3). Taking into account a non-negativity constraint, this yields the symmetric
capacity set by each firm at the equilibrium of our three-stage game,










and the resulting amount of credit granted by banks, B∗ (3) = cq∗ (3):












In this subsection, we study the general case with N ∈ [2,∞) firms at date 0 and compute the
equilibrium capacity. Similarly to the previous case with N = 3, firm i chooses qi in order
to maximize its expected profit function Ui provided that bank i breaks even, i.e., Vi = 0.
Recalling that q∗ denotes the equilibrium capacity installed by all other rivals, in Appendix
A.1 we derive the following expression for firm i’s expected profits:
Ui = p
[









where qi is the capacity installed by firm i.
Formula (8) is to be interpreted similarly to (5). With probability p firm i is success-
ful and earns PNqi, with PN = S − b [qi + (N − 1) q∗] indicating the price of the homoge-
neous good when the total production is equal to the total capacity, qi + (N − 1) q∗. The
extra-revenue PN (N − 1) q∗ accrues to firm i when it is the only buyer of all rivals’ PAs
- this occurs with probability p(1 − p)N−1 - acquires them at zero expected cost, and pro-
duces at the additional capacity (N − 1) q∗. Instead, with probability (1− p) firm i fails and
makes zero profit. However, if at least two rivals are healthy - this occurs with probability[
1− (1− p)N−1 − (N − 1) p (1− p)N−2
]
- bank i anticipates it will cash the equilibrium offer
PNqi paid by a healthy rival to acquire the PAs of firm i. As a result, the expected repayment
pri required by bank i to break even is reduced by the amount PNqi. The last term, cqi,
denotes the cost of installing the capacity qi.
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At date 0, firm i chooses qi to maximize (8) given that q
∗ is the equilibrium capacity set









(N + 1)− (1− p)N−1
[
N + 1 + p (N − 1)2 − 2p
]}
 (9)
and the resulting equilibrium amount of credit granted by banks, B∗ = cq∗, reported in the
following









(N + 1)− (1− p)N−1
[
N + 1 + p (N − 1)2 − 2p
]}
 . (10)
Proof. In Appendix A.1.
4 Comparative Statics
We discuss how the equilibrium credit B∗, calculated in Proposition 1, varies with the number
of active firms N at date 0 and the success probability p. Given the complicated formula of
B∗, we resort to numerical examples, while we develop a more general analysis in Appendix
A.1. Without loss of generality, we can fix both parameters S and b to 1.
In Figure 1, we let c = 0.7 to fulfill Assumption 1 and draw the equilibrium credit B∗ in
space (p,N, q∗).
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 shows that: (i) B∗ is zero when p tends to zero; (ii) B∗ is zero for p ≤ 0.7 when
N tends to 2; (iii) B∗ is positive for any N ≥ 2 when p ≥ 0.7; (iv) provided that p is not
close to 1, there is an inverted U-shaped relation between B∗, when positive, and N ; (v) B∗
is monotonically decreasing in N when p is close to 1.
The above findings can be explained as follows.
(i) The equilibrium credit B∗ is zero when p tends to zero, i.e., when it is likely that all
firms will fail, because the representative firm i’s expected profits (8) become negative, hence
firm i neither invests in capacity nor borrows money.
(ii) Similarly, B∗ is zero when N tends to 2 and p is relatively small (p ≤ 0.7 in Figure 1).
The intuition is as follows. Suppose N = 2 and denote with q∗ (2) the resulting equilibrium
capacity; firm is’ expected profits (8) become
Ui = p [P2qi + (1− p)P2q∗ (2)] + (1− p) 0− cqi. (11)
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When firm i fails - with probability (1− p) - bank i is not able to recover any positive value
from the sale of PAs because there are no rival firms that compete to get them. Such a
negative scenario, where there is no reduction of the expected repayment pri required by
bank i to break even, is more likely to occur as p becomes smaller and smaller. This is why
firm i does not borrow money when N tends to 2 and p is relatively low.
(iii) For all other values of p and N , B∗ is instead positive; in particular, B∗ is initially
increasing and then decreasing in N , provided that p is not too close to 1. This result is driven
by two opposite forces. On the one hand, the equilibrium price PN = S − bNq∗ is negatively
affected by N . This is the standard negative effect on the firms’ profits and, in turn, on q∗
and B∗ as the number of competitors rises. On the other hand, a potential positive effect
arises as the probability of default is taken into account.
To illustrate such positive effect, we consider the two lowest values N = 2 and N = 3.
Firm i s’ expected profits are given by (11) when N = 2 and by (5) when N = 3. Comparing
these two expressions, one can remark that in case firm i is failing - with probability (1− p)
- a positive liquidation value for PAs, P3qi, may be recovered only when N = 3 provided
that both rivals are healthy - with probability p2. Put differently, the second-hand PAs of
a failing firm are valuable only if at least two rivals are healthy and compete to buy them.
Because the probability of such a favorable event is positively affected by N , an increasing
number of active competitors at date 0 positively impacts on the PAs’ expected liquidation
value, augments firms’ expected profits and, in turn, enhances B∗.
However, the above positive effect vanishes when a very large number of competitors are
active at date 0. The reason is that the PAs’ liquidation value, PNqi, tends to zero if N →∞
because PN is decreasing in N . This is why the equilibrium credit B
∗ becomes decreasing in
N as N →∞
(iv) Finally, B∗ is monotonically decreasing in N when p tends to 1. When it is very
likely that all firms are healthy, almost no trade of second-hand PAs occurs: this means that
there is no liquidation value of PAs and, in turn, no positive effect of PMC on firms’ profits.
Indeed, firm i’s expected profits (8) become approximately Ui = PNqi − cqi. This value is
decreasing in N because the equilibrium price PN = S − bNq∗ is negatively affected by N .
As a result, q∗ and B∗ are decreasing in N .
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We investigate here two extensions of the baseline model. In Subsection 5.1, we relax the
hypothesis that only healthy rivals can purchase PAs of distressed firms by also considering
outside firms as potential buyers. In Subsection 5.2, we relax Assumption 1 and solve a
simplified version of the three-stage game described in Section 2 for any c ∈ (0, S).
5.1 Entry through Acquisition: the Role of Outsiders
Suppose there are at least two symmetric risk-neutral firms, referred to as outsiders, producing
the same good as the healthy incumbents, or a similar one, but active in a different relevant
market. Assume that at date 1/2, at least two of these firms are willing to acquire the second-
hand PAs from distressed incumbents to be able to enter the incumbents’ market. We denote
with E the entry cost borne by outsiders to acquire the PAs of each failing incumbent firm.
Consistently with the previous analysis, we assume that outsiders make an offer for all
the PAs on sale. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we also suppose that outsiders
can afford to pay both the resale price of PAs and the entry cost.
We study how the presence of outsiders affects the trade of PAs by computing the equi-
librium offers for each failing firm’s PAs; as in the case without outsiders, we analyze three
alternative scenarios, depending on the number H of healthy incumbents at date 1/2.
(i) When H ∈ [2, N − 1] incumbents are healthy, their offer for a single failing firm’s PAs is
PN q̂. This value is taken from (1), with PN = S−bNq̂, q̂ denoting the symmetric equilibrium
capacity set by the incumbent firms at date 0 when the potential entry of outsiders is taken
into account. The outsiders’ reservation value, PN q̂−E, is instead negatively affected by the
entry cost E. Since this value is lower than the price offered by incumbents, the PAs on sale
are assigned to an incumbent firm at the unit equilibrium price PN q̂.
(ii) When only one incumbent is healthy, H = 1, we rely on the Bertrand argument to
assume that this incumbent outbids by ε the outsiders’ reservation value, therefore getting
the PAs on sale at the unit equilibrium offer PN q̂ − E + ε.
(iii) Finally, when all incumbent firms are healthy, H = N , there is no trade of PAs; more
interestingly, when all incumbents fail, H = 0, only outsiders are in the position to buy PAs;
since they are competing for the PAs, the equilibrium offer for each asset is given by their
reservation value, PN q̂ − E.
A crucial difference arises compared to the case without outsiders. Banks recover a
positive liquidation value for their distressed clients’ PAs under any possible scenario, i.e.,
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even when all incumbent firms are in distress, H = 0, because there are outsiders that
compete to buy them. This affects firm i’s expected profit function, which becomes
Ui,O = PNqi − (1− p)N E − cqi : (12)
see Appendix A.2 for computations. Revenue PNqi, with PN = S−b [qi + (N − 1) q̂] denoting
the price of the homogeneous good when the total production is equal to the total capacity,
qi + (N − 1) q̂, is obtained with certainty by firm i, either directly when firm i is healthy,
or indirectly through a reduction on the expected repayment required by bank i to break
even. Indeed, bank i anticipates that it will cash the equilibrium offer PNqi paid by a healthy
incumbent or, when all incumbents are failing - probability (1− p)N - the equilibrium offer
PNqi − E paid by an outsider.
At date 0, firm i chooses qi to maximize (12) given that q̂ is the equilibrium capacity set
by rival incumbents; this yields q̂ and the equilibrium amount of credit granted by banks,
B̂ = cq̂, reported in the following
Proposition 2 When at least two outsiders are willing to purchase the failing (incumbent)





Proof. In Appendix A.2.
Expression (13) is equivalent to (10) after substituting p = 1. This means that the
equilibrium capacity ultimately reduces to the standard Cournot value when there are at
least two outsiders willing to make an offer for the PAs of the failing incumbent firms; as a
result, B̂ is monotonically decreasing in N . To provide a graphical representation of B̂, it is
sufficient to set p = 1 in Figure 1. Unlike the case without outsiders, B̂ is positive for any
p, which implies that incumbent firms invest in capacity even if the success probability p is
small.
Interestingly, the potential favorable effect of an increasing number of rivals at date 0
on the PAs’ liquidation value and, in turn, on firms’ profits disappears. The intuition is as
follows. As explained in Section 4, such a favorable effect lies in the fact that the PAs of
failing firms are valuable only when at least two rivals are healthy, the probability of which is
positively affected by N . Put differently, a greater number of competitors at date 0 reduces
the risk that banks do not recover a positive value for the collateralized PAs of their failing
clients. This risk disappears here because there are outsiders that make an offer for PAs even
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if none of the incumbents are healthy. As a result, only the standard negative effect of a
larger number of rivals on the equilibrium price and, in turn, on the equilibrium capacity and
credit, is at work.3
To conclude this section, we provide a comparison between the equilibrium credit without
outsiders, B∗, and the corresponding value when outsiders are present, B̂.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium credit is lower when no outsiders are willing to purchase
PAs. In symbols, B∗ < B̂.
Proof. In Appendix A.3.
The existence of outsiders enhances the liquidity of distressed incumbents’ PAs by increas-
ing the number of states in which the resale value is positive. As a result, the equilibrium
credit increases compared to the case without outsiders.
5.2 Capacity-constrained Quantity Competition Game
We now relax Assumption 1 and investigate, for any c ∈ (0, S), the pure-strategy SPNEs of
the three-stage capacity-constrained quantity competition game described in Section 2. For
the sake of simplicity, we focus on two specific market structures, namely duopoly (N = 2),
and triopoly (N = 3), and then discuss the general oligopoly case, N ≥ 2.
The main features of the SPNEs are described by separately considering two scenarios:4










if N = 3);
(ii) relatively low values of c (i.e., c ≤ p
2S
4 if N = 2 and c ≤
p2(3−2p)S
3 if N = 3).
Scenario (i). In the first scenario, the SPNE is shown to be as in the baseline analysis.
The intuition, anticipated in Section 2, is as follows. The equilibrium level of capacity is
negatively affected by (cfr. expressions (6) or (9)): when c is large, firms install relatively
little capacity at date 0. As a consequence, at date 1/2, all healthy firms find it profitable
to make an offer for all the PAs on sale in order to expand the limited capacity installed at
date 0. At date 1, they compete à la Cournot by producing as much as they can, that is, at
full capacity.
3For the sake of completeness, we briefly discuss the case where there is only one outsider. One can show




1 − (1 − p)N
]
S − c2
b [2 + (N − 1)]
[
1 − (1 − p)N
]
 . (a)
Similarly to B∗, computed in Proposition 1, there is an inverted U-shaped relation between (a) and N , provided
that p is not close to 1.
4The complete proof is in Appendix B.
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This result helps explain the role of Assumption 1 in our framework: Assumption 1
ensures that the two parametric conditions, which define Scenario (i) and yield the above
described SPNE, are fulfilled not only for N equal to 2 or 3, but in general for any N ≥ 2.
To verify this claim, in Appendix C we show that Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for
all H ∈ [1, N − 1] healthy firms to be willing to make an offer for the all the PAs on sale, i.e.
N −H ∈ [1, N − 1] at date 1/2, and to produce at full capacity at date 1.
Overall, the relatively little capacity installed at date 0 under scenario (i), or, more
generally, under Assumption 1, induces (healthy) firms to strongly rely on the trade of second-
hand PAs in order to increase their production capacity and to produce as much as they can in
the third-stage Cournot competition. In other words, Assumption 1 gives particular emphasis
to the role played by PAs’ liquidation value in driving firms’ investment decisions, and, in
turn, credit conditions.
Scenario (ii). In the second scenario, Assumption 1 is not fulfilled because c is relatively low.
The SPNE takes then the following different features. The first-stage equilibrium capacity
is larger than in Scenario (i). At date 1/2, healthy firms find it profitable to make an offer
not for all the PAs on sale, but just for either a fraction or none of them; the reason is that
healthy firms installed enough capacity to produce the third-stage Cournot quantity. As a
result, at date 1 healthy firms compete à la Cournot by holding excess capacity.
The above result shows that the equilibrium behavior of firms is different when Assump-
tion 1 is relaxed. Nevertheless, our findings concerning the relationship between the equilib-
rium credit and the degree of PMC when outsiders are absent are not qualitatively affected.
Indeed, the solution to the three-stage game for any c ∈ (0, S), provided in Appendix B,
confirms that the equilibrium credit can be either increasing or decreasing in N = {2, 3}
depending on the value of p: this is in line with the baseline results. Interestingly, when c
tends to zero, the equilibrium credit is increasing in N = {2, 3} for any p.
6 Discussion of the Theoretical Framework
In this section, we discuss some of the assumptions made in our model to simplify the analysis
and to gain in terms of tractability.
More active or risk-averse banks? In the model, banks are assumed to operate on a
break-even basis, to have no bargaining power, and to be risk-neutral.
Both the break-even and the zero bargaining power assumptions imply that firms’ payoff
is equivalent to the full surplus, (5) when N = 3 and (8) in the general case of N ≥ 2. The
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alternative assumption is that firms and banks split the surplus according to some rule, e.g.,
a portion α ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus to firms and (1− α) to banks; in this case, the proof in
Appendix D shows that the equilibrium capacity (6) is not affected. This result can be easily
extended to the case of N ≥ 2.
The assumption of risk-neutral banks does not qualitatively affect our results because
banks, in our framework, bear the minimum share of credit risk compatible with limited
liability. More precisely, loans are not repaid only when the cash flow of firms, which are
protected by limited liability, is zero and there is no resale of PAs. If banks were risk-averse,
this risk allocation could not be manipulated in a more favorable way for them.
Bertrand competition in the second-hand market for PAs. In our model, firms are
symmetric in their valuation of PAs since they supply a homogeneous product and have
identical costs of setting their capacity. This implies perfect substitutability among buyers
of second-hand PAs. In addition, buyers are not credit constrained at t = 1/2 because they
receive extra lending by banks. Given that all buyers have the same reservation value and
are not credit constrained, it is quite natural to consider Bertrand competition in the second-
hand market for PAs. This implies that when at least two buyers are present, each buyer
bids up to its reservation value.
Considering different types of competition (e.g., buyers bidding less than their reservation
value) is harmless, as long as a positive liquidation value for PAs is recovered when at least
two competitors are healthy. Indeed, the crucial driver of the inverted U-shaped relationship
between the number of competitors and the equilibrium credit is the existence of a positive
expected resale value of PAs.
Idiosyncratic versus common shocks. The assumption of idiosyncratic and indepen-
dent shocks is made for analytical tractability. In the real world, however, competitors are
exposed to correlated shocks, given by a combination of common and idiosyncratic factors.
Interestingly, our results prove to be robust to the assumption of correlated shocks, provided
that correlation is not 1. Indeed, the result that a larger number of incumbent firms increase
the expected liquidation value of PAs and may enhance the investment in capacity can be
obtained only if trade of PAs takes place. With perfectly positively correlated shocks, there
is no trade because either all firms are healthy (i.e., no sellers) or failing (i.e., no buyers): the
standard negative effect of competition on firms’ profits and, in turn, on the investment in
capacity prevails. By contrast, moving away from perfect correlation, there is the possibility
that some rivals are in the position to bid for the PAs of distressed rivals. Accordingly, our
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results hold even when the assumption of independent shocks is relaxed provided that some
degree of idiosyncraticity is retained (for a complete discussion of this issue in a framework
similar to ours but with asymmetric information, see Cerasi and Fedele, 2011).
7 Related Empirical Evidence
We discuss the existing empirical evidence related to the assumptions and implications of our
theoretical model.
Following Shleifer and Vishny (1992), the model rests on the assumption that when PAs
are specific to a particular industry, rivals within the same industry are the best potential
users of the assets of distressed firms. As a result, credit-constrained firms could increase their
debt capacity when direct rivals are in a position to bid for their PAs. The reasonableness of
this hypothesis is indirectly supported by Almeida et al. (2011) who show that liquid firms
are more likely to acquire distressed firms in industries in which assets are industry-specific,
but transferable across firms; and that firms are more likely to use credit lines when such
mergers are more frequent. Acharya et al. (2007) confirms that the recovery rate of defaulted
firms’ creditors is significantly lower when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress, while
Gavazza (2010) shows the positive effects of lower trading frictions in PAs secondary markets
on within-industry capital reallocation. Evidence of a positive relation between collateral
liquidation value and loan-to-value ratio is provided by Benmelech and Bergman (2009) for
the U.S. airline industry, while Gan (2007) shows that the loss of value in the collateral
reduces the ability of firms to obtain bank lending. Benmelech et al. (2005) show that firms
within the same residential area raise more debt when there are more potential buyers of their
collateralized assets and Benmelech and Bergman (2011) prove that the deterioration of a
company’s financial conditions has a sizeable impact on the cost of debt of its rivals as a result
of the loss of value of their collateral. MacKay and Phillips (2005) and more recently Rauh
and Sufi (2012) provide evidence of the importance of rivals and the type of their productive
assets to explain leverage for a panel of US firms. This evidence is consistent with the idea
that the degree of liquidity of PAs has a positive effect on the amount of lending. More
recently, Bustamante and Frésard (2016) provide evidence that rivals matter for individual
investment behavior.
There are several recent empirical papers investigating how the structure of the product
market affects the investment behavior and financial decisions of the firms, and their typical
conclusions are that a higher degree of PMC has a negative impact on investments and credit
17











conditions. Valta (2012) analyzes the terms of loan contracts and finds evidence of an increase
in the cost of debt for firms operating in more competitive industries. Similarly, Huang and
Lee (2013) find a positive effect of PMC on the probability of default, that in turn increases
credit costs. Among the paper gauging the effect of an increase in PMC following trade
liberalization on individual firms’ behavior, Xu (2012) finds a negative effect on leverage
through profitability, while Frésard and Valta (2016) find a negative effect on investment due
to the greater threat of entry related to trade liberalization.
The predictions of our theoretical model are partially in contrast with the aforementioned
literature. In fact, in our model when only incumbents are willing to bid for the PAs of the
distressed firms, an increase in PMC may increase the amount of credit (see Proposition
1); whereas when outsiders are present this effect is negative (see Proposition 2). Using
a sample of Italian SMEs that rely on bank credit to finance their investment, Cerasi et
al. (2017) find evidence of a positive effect of PMC on credit and investment whenever only
incumbent companies have potential interest to bid for the PAs, while no significant effects are
estimated when outsiders are present. We read this result as first evidence of the usefulness
of our model to describe the mechanisms at work in markets in which the greater competitive
pressure comes from incumbents and not by the threat of entry on the part of outsiders.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a model in which credit conditions are affected by the degree of
PMC. To this end, we considered not only the standard negative effect of PMC on profits
but also the impact on the resale value of PAs put up as collateral. Whenever such PAs are
specific to a given production, having more competitors in the output market enhances the
resale value thanks to a higher demand for the PAs in case of liquidation. As outcome of this
trade-off, we found an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of rivals and the
equilibrium bank credit. Interestingly, the amount of bank credit was shown to monotonically
decrease in PMC, when there are firms outside the industry willing to acquire the PAs of
distressed incumbents.
The framework hinges upon a number of assumptions, whose role was discussed in Section
6. In addition to these hypotheses, it is worth noting that the probability of firms’ default
was supposed not to be affected by the degree of PMC. This might be restrictive as PMC can
increase the likelihood of a default and therefore mitigate the positive effect of PMC through
the collateral channel. We leave for future research the extension of the model to the case in
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which the probability of default depends on PMC.
As a final consideration, the liquidation of PAs was assumed to be costly for outsiders but
not for healthy incumbents, hence, the transfer of PAs does not imply any deadweight loss.
If we were to assume liquidation costs, similarly to Salgado et al. (2016), the equilibrium
amount of bank credit would be reduced but the positive effect of PMC through the collateral
channel would still be present.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Firm i’s expected profits at date 0, expression (8), is computed as follows. With probability
(1 − p), firm i defaults and makes zero profits. With probability p, firm i gains PNqi and







pH (1− p)N−1−H 1
H + 1
PN (N − 1−H) q∗ : (A.1)






each one with probability pH (1− p)N−1−H - firm i gets PAs of all distressed rivals with
probability 1H+1 . Summing up, firm i’s expected profit is:







pH (1− p)N−1−H 1
H + 1
PN (N − 1−H) q∗. (A.2)
To calculate the expected profits of bank i, we first rely on the argument developed in Section
3 to sum up the equilibrium offers for a single failing firm’s PAs:
vN (1, H) =

0 if H = N − 1,
PNq
∗ if H ∈ [1, N − 2] ,
ε if H = 0,
vN (0, H) =

PNqi if H ∈ [2, N − 1] ,
ε if H = 1,
0 if H = 0.
(A.3)
Notation (1, H) indicates that firm i plus H firms are healthy, whilst (0, H) that firm i is
failing and H firms are healthy. With probability p, firm i is healthy, repays ri but needs
extra borrowing to make an offer for the distressed rivals’ PAs at unit price vN (1, H). With
probability (1− p), firm i fails, hence the bank seizes PAs and recovers the liquidation value
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where the last term is the opportunity cost of the loan. Substituting the equilibrium offers
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pH (1− p)N−1−H = 1− (1− p)N−1 − (N − 1) p (1− p)N−2 (A.6)
according to the Binomial density formula. Maximizing (8) with respect to qi, when all rivals
set their capacity at the equilibrium level q∗, and taking into account the non-negativity
constraint on the capacity level yields the result in the text.
To prove the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between B∗ and N , it is
sufficient to proceed in two steps: (i) showing that limN→∞B
∗ = 0; (ii) proving that B∗ (3) >
B∗ (2) ≥ 0 ⇔ p ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), with 0 < p∗ < cS < p
∗∗ < 1. To simplify the exposition, we
disregard the non-negativity constraint on B∗; this does not affect the result.
(i) Consider separately numerator and denominator of B∗. On the one hand, the limit
for N that goes to ∞ of the numerator of B∗ can be written as
c
[
(S − c)− S × lim
N→∞
(1− p)N−1 (Np− 2p+ 1)
]
, (14)
where limN→∞ (1− p)N−1 (Np− 2p+ 1) can be rearranged as limN→∞ (Np−2p+1)(1−p)1−N . Applying
L’Hôpital’s rule to this limit yields − pln(1−p) limN→∞ (1− p)
N−1 = 0. It follows that (14) is
equal to c (S − c).










N + 1 + p (N − 1)2 − 2p
]}
. (15)














(1− p)N−1 = 0. (17)
It follows that (15) is equal to ∞.
In conclusion, the limit of the numerator for N that goes to ∞, converges to c(S − c) as
proven in (14), while the limit of the denominator, converges to ∞, as proven in (15). Thus
the limit of B∗ converges to zero.
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(ii) B∗ (2) = cbp
pS−c















negative when p→ 0, positive when p = 1, and zero at p = cS .
Similarly, B∗ (3) = cbp
(p+(1−p)p2)S−c


















negative when p→ 0, positive when p = 1, and zero at p = p∗, where p∗ is the only solution to
p+ (1− p) p2 = cS . Since both p and p+ (1− p) p
2 are monotonically increasing in p ∈ (0, 1)












When p > cS , both B




at p = 1; this implies that











is the only solution to B∗ (2) = B∗ (3); it also implies that B∗ (2) >
B∗ (3) > 0⇔ p ∈ (p∗∗, 1]. The result follows from (20) and (21).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The outsiders’ equilibrium offers for each of the failing firm’s PAs are
vN,O (1, H) =

0 if H = N − 1,
PN q̂ if H ∈ [1, N − 2] ,
PN q̂ − E + ε if H = 0
vN,O (0, H) =

PN q̂ if H ∈ [2, N − 1] ,
PN q̂ − E + ε if H = 1,
PN q̂ − E if H = 0,
(A.7)
where subscript O stands for outsider, (1, H) indicates that incumbent firm i plus H incum-
bent firms are healthy, whilst (0, H) that incumbent firm i is failing and H incumbent firms
are healthy. Firm i’s expected profit is as in (A.2), with q̂ instead of q∗. On the contrary,
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pH (1− p)N−1−H PNqi − (1− p)N−1E
)
− cqi
We solve Vi,O = 0 by pri and substitute the result into firm’s i profit. This gives equation
(12) in the text. Maximizing (12) with respect to qi, when all rivals set their capacity at the
equilibrium level q̂, yields the result in the text.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that B∗ ≤ B̂ ⇔ q∗ < q̂, we first observe that q̂ > 0 for any p and N , hence q∗ < q̂
when q∗ = 0. We then focus on positive values of q∗ and remark that q∗− q̂ can be rewritten
as

































Note that (A.9) > (A.8). Expression (A.9) can be rearranged as
p (N − 1) (1− p)N
(N + 1)
{
(1− p)N [N + 1− p (1 + 2N −N2)]− (N + 1) (1− p)
} ,
which is negative iff
(1− p)N−1 {1− p+N [1 + p (N − 2)]} < (N + 1) . (A.10)
To see that inequality (A.10) is fulfilled, note that the LHS of (A.10) is decreasing in p, hence
it reaches the maximum value of N + 1 at p = 0 and recall that p ∈ (0, 1]. This implies
that 0 > (A.9) > (A.8) and, in turn, that q∗ − q̂ = B∗ − B̂ is strictly negative for any given
admissible (p,N).
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B Relaxing Assumption 1
N=2. When two firms are present at date 0 and c ∈ (0, S), the SPNE is as follows. At date
0, the two firms borrow B∗C (2) = cq
∗






























where subscript C stands for Cournot; unsurprisingly, q∗C (2) is decreasing in c.
At date 1/2, there is only one healthy firm with probability 2p (1− p), in which case this
firm, referred to as ex-post monopolist, buys the PAs of the only distressed rival at price ε.
At date 1, each healthy firm produces at full capacity q∗C (2) when both firms are healthy
because such capacity is lower than the Cournot duopoly quantity with zero production costs,
S
3b , for any c > 0. When only one firm is healthy, its capacity is equal to 2q
∗
C (2); this value is













; 2q∗C (2) is instead lower





, in which case the firm produces at full capacity.
N=3. When three firms are present at date 0 and c ∈ (0, S), the SPNE is as follows. At
date 0, the three firms borrow B∗C (3) = cq
∗









































































At date 1/2, there are two healthy and one distressed firms with probability 3p2 (1− p);
in this case, the two healthy firms, referred to as ex-post duopolists, are not willing to buy






because they installed enough capacity at date 0 to
produce the Cournot duopoly quantity, S3b ; they are instead willing to offer their reservation





because the capacity installed at date 0 is lower than
S
3b . With probability 3p (1− p)
2, there are one healthy and two distressed firms; the ex-post







2q∗C (3) is enough to produce the monopoly quantity
S
2b ; the ex-post monopolist buys the PAs





because 2q∗C (3) is not enough to produce the
monopoly quantity.
At date 1: (i) when all firms are healthy, they produce the Cournot triopoly quantity S4b












, while they produce at full capacity





; indeed, q∗C (3) is lower than
S
4b only in the latter interval of c. (ii)
When two firms are healthy, they produce the Cournot duopoly quantity, S3b , and hold excess
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; if c is higher, the healthy firms compete to get
the PAs of the distressed rival: the firm that does not obtain them produces at full capacity
q∗C (3); the other firm produces
S−bq∗C(3)




















Finally, when only one firm is healthy, it produces the monopoly quantity, S2b , and holds excess












We discuss two results that are mentioned in the text

















6b , are such that the ex-post monop-
olist is not able to produce the monopoly quantity even when buying the PAs of all distressed
rivals. In this case, we showed that all healthy firms - the ex-post monopolist under N = 2
and both the ex-post monopolist and duopolists under N = 3 - find it profitable to buy all
the PAs on sale at date 1/2 and to produce at full capacity at date 1. This is exactly the
scenario studied in the baseline analysis for the general case of N ≥ 2.
2) Comparing B∗C (2) with B
∗
C (3) for any given c ∈ [0, S), one can check that the equilib-
rium credit can be either increasing or decreasing in N depending on the value of p unless c




















when N = 2 and cS3b when N = 3, with the former being weakly
lower for any p.
C Making an offer for all the PAs on sale?
To show that Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for all healthy firms to make an offer for
all the PAs on sale, we consider a representative firm i at date 1/2 and suppose it is healthy.
Two relevant cases where the transfer of PAs may occur must be analyzed separately: (i)
either no rival is healthy, in which case firm i is referred to as the ex-post monopolist; (ii) or
H − 1 ∈ [1, N − 2] rivals are healthy.
(i) When firm i is the only potential buyer, it may buy the PAs of up to N − 1 failing
rivals; if it makes an offer for the PAs of n ∈ [0, N − 1] rivals, its third-stage revenue, net of
its offers for the PAs on sale and in case it produces at full capacity, is Pn+1 (n+ 1) q, where
Pn+1 = S − b (n+ 1) q indicates the demand function when PAs of n + 1 firms stay in the
market and q denotes the symmetric capacity set by firms at date 0. As Pn+1 (n+ 1) q is





is sufficient for firm i’s revenue Pn+1 (n+ 1) q to be increasing in n and therefore maximized
at n = N − 1. Condition (A.13) implies that firm i cannot produce the third-stage monopoly
quantity, S2b , even when buying the PAs of all distressed rivals. As a result, firm i acquires
all the PAs on sale and then produces at full capacity in order to reduce the gap from the
profit-maximizing monopoly quantity, S2b . Plugging q
∗ into (A.13) and rearranging yields the
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(ii) When firm i plus H − 1 ∈ [1, N − 2] rivals are healthy, H ∈ [2, N − 1] firms may be
willing to buy PAs of up to N −H ∈ [1, N − 2] failing competitors. We first focus on N = 4,
so that H is either 2 or 3, and then move to the general case.
When H = 2, two firms, say i and j, may buy the PAs of up to two rivals. Recalling
that offers are simultaneous, the two firms play the following simultaneous symmetric game,
where q denotes the equilibrium capacity with N = 4:
firm j makes an offer for →



















No PAs P4q; 3P4q P3q; 2P3q P2q;P2q
(A.15)
Payoffs are the firms’ third-stage expected revenues, net of their offers for the PAs on sale,
in case they produce at full capacity. The payoffs in the first cell are computed as follows.
If both firms play ”PAs of both failing rivals”, they are willing to pay the same reservation
value P4q, derived from (1) with N = 4, for each failing rival’s PAs. Accordingly, there is a
tie in the offers, in which case the ownership of the two PAs is randomly allocated to a single
firm. The expected payoff for firm i is thus 12P43q +
1
2P4q = 2P4q: P43q when it obtains the
PAs of both failing competitors - this occurs with probability 12 ; P4q when it does not obtain
the PAs - this occurs with probability 12 . Note that P4 = S − b4q indicates the price of the
homogeneous good when the total production is equal to the total capacity, 4q, regardless
of the allocation of PAs among firms i and j. Consider now the payoffs in the second cell.
Firm i plays ”PAs of both failing rivals” and firm j plays ”PAs of one failing rival”; firm i
thus obtains with probability 1 the PAs which firm j is not making an offer for, while it gets
the PAs of the other failing rival with probability 12 , since both players offer P4q for them.











the other cells are computed similarly. It is easy to check that ”PAs of both failing rivals”
is a dominant strategy when Pn+1 (n+ 1) q is increasing in n. Therefore, at the unique NE,
the two firms make an offer to acquire all the PAs on sale (two) if (A.14) holds true.
When H = 3, three firms may be willing to buy the PA of the only failing competitor.
Again, one can check that condition (A.14) implies that the only NE is such that the three
healthy firms make an offer for the single failing rival’s PAs on sale.
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One can generalize the analysis to N ∈ [2,∞) by considering the following game:
healthy rival makes
an offer for →
firm i makes an offer for
H − 1 ∈ [1, N − 2]
↓
PAs of n ∈ [1, N −H]
failing rivals
No PAs
PAs of n ∈ [1, N −H]
rivals
1






PH+n (n+ 1) q
No PAs PH+nq PHq
(A.16)
Given the symmetry of payoffs, we write only firm i’s payoffs in each cell; they are computed
as follows. If all healthy firms play ”PAs of n failing rivals”, they are willing to pay the same
reservation value Pnq for each failing rival’s PAs. Accordingly, there is a tie in the offers,
in which case the ownership of n PAs is randomly allocated to a single firm. The expected
payoff for firm i is thus: PH+n (n+ 1) q when it obtains the PAs - this occurs with probability
1
H ; PH+nq when it does not obtain the PAs - this occurs with probability 1−
1
H . The other
payoffs are computed similarly.
If H − 1 healthy rivals play ”PAs of n failing rivals”, the best response of firm i is to play




PH+nq > PH+nq. If H−1 healthy
rivals play ”no PAs”, the best response of firm i is to play ”PAs of n rivals” if PH+n (n+ 1) q >
PHq. This inequality is implied by (A.14). To see this, note that PH+n (n+ 1) q > PHq is
implied by PH+n+1 (n+ 2) q ≥ PH+n (n+ 1) q for any n ∈ [0, N −H]. In turn, the latter
condition is equivalent to n+2n+1 ≥
PH+n
PH+n+1
. This inequality is fulfilled because n+2n+1 >
n+1+H
n+H
is implied by H ∈ [2, N − 1] and n+1+Hn+H ≥
Pn+H
Pn+1+H
.by (A.14). As a result, when condition
(A.14) holds true, the unique NE of the above game is such that all the healthy firms make
an offer for the PAs of all failing rivals.





2 . The result follows.
D Relaxing the Banks’ Break-even Assumption
Suppose N = 3 and that firm 1 and bank 1 split surplus S into two shares, αS to the firm
and (1−α)S to the bank, where α ∈ [0, 1] and S is equivalent to (5). Equating the expected
profit function of bank 1, (3), to (1− α)S yields the repayment to the bank as a function of
α:
pr1 = αcq1+(1−α)pP3q1+(1−α)p(1−p)2P32q∗(3)−α(1−p)p2P3q1+p2(1−p)P3q∗ (3) (22)





P3q1 + (1− p)2P32q∗(3)
]
+ (1− p)p2P3q1 − cq1
}
(23)
Expression (23) is equivalent to (2), except for the multiplier α. When taking the derivative
of (23) with respect to q1, we obtain the equilibrium capacity (6).
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